US-Russia Relations: What's Next? Trump is negotiating with Russia, but Ukraine will bear the cost.
Relations Between the USA and Ukraine: What’s Next?
The middle of February (the week leading up to and during the Munich Security Conference) was a shocking period for Europe (from the perspective of the USA). On February 18, Trump initiated a “shock therapy” approach towards Ukraine.
Many were surprised as to why this happened and why it occurred at this particular moment. In reality, there’s no reason to be astonished; we found ourselves on a list that previously included Denmark (in connection with Trump’s interest in Greenland), Canada, Mexico, Panama, and broadly, all of Europe (excluding the right-wing populist allies of Trump’s team). Sooner or later, aggressive pressure from Trump was bound to manifest itself regarding Ukraine. This is the essence of the Trumpist worldview and a hallmark of his policies: the primary focus is money; and this money must be extracted from those who are weaker and dependent on the USA.
The immediate cause for Trump’s aggressive statements and those from high-ranking officials in his administration was President Zelensky's refusal to sign a burdensome deal concerning Ukraine's strategic resources, while the formal trigger was Zelensky's criticism of the negotiations between the USA and Russia in Riyadh. Trump strongly dislikes being refused, and even more so when he is criticized. And then it all escalated. I won’t reiterate what everyone has already heard and seen. However, the wave of aggression from Washington towards President Zelensky is also a tested tactic of aggressive pressure on the Ukrainian leadership, aimed at coercing Kyiv into signing the resource agreement proposed by the USA.
But it’s crucial to understand that this issue is not solely about Trump’s irritation towards Zelensky, nor just about the attempt to force us into signing a resource agreement. It is already evident that the USA's policy towards us, towards Russia, and towards Europe is significantly changing. This is noticeable not only in Trump’s rhetoric but also in the concrete actions of the USA in the UN, in negotiations with Russia, and in relations with us, among other things. For Trump, reaching an agreement with Russia is more important than reaching an agreement with us. And we must pay Trump for the services rendered as non-repayable aid. The approaches of the USA to its foreign policy are radically changing. Liberal-democratic values are being discarded (or replaced entirely with a mercantile-conservative and selfish interpretation of US national interests), money is prioritized over global security interests of the USA, aggressive dictation is applied instead of partnership, even towards allies, and major deals (big deals) with those who have traditionally been strategic competitors or even enemies of the USA are prioritized.
Why is it necessary to recognize this? Because we will have to seek an optimal balance between tactics and strategy in our relations with the USA in the context of our confrontation with Russian aggression, both now and in the future.
Currently, we need to alleviate the conflict tension surrounding the resource agreement and in our overall relations with Trump and his administration. Apparently, we will have to make some concessions to the United States regarding the resource agreement, to preserve for Ukraine even the mere possibility of purchasing American weapons. However, the previous forms of non-repayable military aid will no longer exist. And dreaming about economic assistance from the USA may be futile. Who knows what concessions the USA will demand from us for the formal cessation of the war in Ukraine? In this matter, we may have to make some unpleasant compromises. And God forbid that these remain compromises and do not turn into one-sided concessions from Ukraine. Among the possible demands, there may be some that are absolutely unacceptable to us, such as the recognition of occupied territories as Russian.
I draw attention to these circumstances so that none of us harbors illusions that we can return to previous partner relations with the USA. If partnership exists, it will be situational and inertial in nature. Moreover, we will be fighting to preserve at least the remnants of partnership relations. The Trump administration will not view us as partners, especially not as strategic partners. The attitude towards us will be that of an object of trade with Russia and as a resource asset (and it would be good if it were for future purposes, but it may simply be seen as a source of compensation for past expenses).
What conclusions can we draw from the current (already new) situation in our relations with the USA? This situation may change to some extent (in a negative or perhaps a positive direction, if Trump calms down a bit and it becomes beneficial for him to support Ukraine), it may even swing like on American (Trumpian) roller coasters, but the main trends I mentioned above are already evident.
From the perspective of current tactical interests, we must and even should seek certain relatively acceptable compromises with the Trump Administration regarding the resource agreement, the conditions for ending the Russian-Ukrainian war, and some other topics. Some of these compromises may be painful for us. However, we cannot (even if we desperately want to) tell Trump to go to hell, as some suggest. The negative consequences for us would be significant, especially in terms of the military situation. For now, we are too dependent on the USA. Therefore, we will have to demonstrate flexibility.
In the context of a longer-term perspective, we must understand that at least during Trump’s presidency, we inevitably lose the USA as Ukraine’s main strategic partner, particularly in the military-political confrontation with Russia. However, this process must be stretched over time and its negative consequences minimized.
At the same time, we need to think about forming a new security strategy. At this point, one thing is clear — our main strategic partner for the future will be European countries (certainly with some exceptions and perhaps in a different form than now). We share common challenges (the new foreign policy and security policy of the USA under Trump) and problems (Russian aggression), but for us, they are more pronounced and dangerous. However, we will need to seek additional safeguards and counter-levers to mitigate threats from Russia and the further turbulent fluctuations of international political conjuncture, including from the USA under Trump’s presidency.
The author expresses a personal opinion that may not coincide with the position of the editorial team. The responsibility for published information in the "Opinions" section lies with the author.