Ceasefire in 2025: How might it happen and what interests do the U.S. and China have in it?

Trump, Putin, Xi, and the World in Ukraine

Even before the official announcement of the election results in the United States, Donald Trump's circle made several statements regarding potential scenarios for ending the war in Ukraine. Specifically, the discussion has shifted towards a "freezing" of the conflict at this stage. Throughout the election campaign, there were essentially two proposed plans: the "Heritage Foundation theses," which advocate for increased support to Ukraine and pressuring Putin for concessions, and the "America First Policy Institute theses," which focus on freezing the conflict along the contact line. In recent days, the latter has been actively discussed. Both of these "plans" entail the initiation of negotiations between Ukraine and Russia without implementing the principle of "the 1991 borders." The difference lies in the fact that the more active approach aims to change the balance on the front lines before negotiating with the Kremlin from a position of strength, making a return to the borders feasible within a political framework. The second approach entails freezing the situation here and now, recognizing (though not necessarily admitting) the impossibility of regaining territories in the foreseeable future. Illustrative examples include the already discussed notions of "forgetting Crimea" or "waiting for changes in Russia."

In this context, the Russian Federation is significantly increasing pressure on the front. Despite considerable losses, the Russian Armed Forces, although they have not collapsed the Ukrainian front, have achieved the most impressive successes in the past three months since 2022. Putin, speaking at the Valdai Club, once again mentioned the "Istanbul agreements" — read, the Russian ultimatum to Ukraine. Moreover, despite the sharp rhetoric, Russia has no urgent need to initiate negotiations. Among the main (and acknowledged by the Kremlin) reasons are:

• the growing technological gap between Russia and developed countries. This refers not only to the so-called "Western world" but also to some countries of the "global South";
• the increasing dependence of the Russian economy on China. It is crucial to focus not only on the trade balance but also on the heightened degree of technological and financial dependency of the Russian economy on China. Essentially, Beijing is doing to Moscow what Moscow has attempted to do with Minsk for the past 30 years. However, the Chinese communists are succeeding more efficiently and quickly;
• Russia is losing geopolitical influence. Central Asia is no longer Russia's "backyard" and is becoming part of the so-called "Chinese world." Turkey's influence in the Caucasus has sharply increased, while Russian interests in the Balkans are shrinking, ceding ground to the interests of the aforementioned China and the Republic of Turkey;
• inside the Russian Federation, there are colossal demographic processes occurring that will significantly influence its future — the so-called "Russian component is dying out," while population numbers are maintained through growth in national autonomies and migration.

All of this has already led to the situation where, having lost leadership in the SCO, the Kremlin could neither impose (nor confirm) its leadership status in BRICS. Moreover, analyzing the basic report of the Valdai Club and Putin's recent speech, one can conclude that there is a shift in positioning. Even on its own platform, Russia no longer presents itself as a leader and "locomotive" of change. Russian speakers (including the president) frequently discuss a multipolar world but appeal to collective formats of the "non-West," where they do not emphasize an exclusive role for their country. Essentially, Russia is being forced to begin positioning itself as a regional rather than a global leader.

The latter — Russia's self-positioning — is one of the key elements in understanding the policies of major global players regarding the end of the war in Ukraine.

Putin began this phase of the war as part of a strategy to maintain Russia's status as one of the world leaders. After all, economically, Russia has long fallen out of the pool of leading states. The same goes for technology. Political influence has gradually waned. The only remaining trump card was military power. This is the card Putin played in hopes of a swift success. If "Kyiv fell in three days," Russia would have regained its influence in the Caucasus, strengthened its position in Central Asia, and solidified its presence in the Balkans and Africa. In essence, through force, it would have compelled the world to recognize it as one of the unquestionable architects of the new world order.

However, "Kyiv did not fall in three days." Moreover, Russia stumbled upon the resistance of a state it had itself positioned as a Failed State. In other words, Putin demonstrated that his "last trump card" in the dialogue about geopolitical leadership is not such. If in 2021, discussions of potential changes in the world system often revolved around the triangle of Washington-Beijing-Moscow, by the end of 2022, the dialogue shifted towards China and the U.S. Russia effectively excluded itself from the process. Thus, Putin's words in January 2023 that the war is being fought "for Russia's future" were true. A defeat or even a conditional "draw" in the Russian-Ukrainian war would strip Russia of its conditional status as a key geopolitical player.

This situation was quite satisfactory for both Beijing and Washington. After all, to put it simply, it is much easier to start a conversation about forming a bipolar world than to engage in a complex dialogue in a trilateral format. This situation also benefited the European Union, which found that the weakening of Kremlin influence on the continent created additional opportunities, including in terms of the EU's subjectivation on the global stage. The weakening of Russia was equally advantageous for new regional leaders, starting with the founders of BRICS (except for Russia, of course) and extending to Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia.

Thus, a complete defeat of Ukraine was and remains disadvantageous for most countries in the world. However, "not losing" does not mean "winning."

Unfortunately, a complete defeat of Russia and the associated risks of a deep crisis in the RF, up to the threat of collapse, were (and largely remain) disadvantageous for key players:

• for the U.S., the collapse of Russia means destabilization in several regions. This could either lead to a dramatic increase in China's influence or force the United States to revert to a costly "world police" policy without guarantees of success. This would increase risks in the security realm and escalate tensions with China;
• for China, Russia is important as a cohesive, manageable state. In a status of regional (but not global) leader with a significant degree of dependence on China;
• for several politicians in the European Union, the perception of Russia closely aligns with the Chinese position — a single, sufficiently powerful state. The only difference lies in assessing the risks of Chinese influence over Russia. For the EU, naturally, such developments are undesirable;
• for most non-Western states (primarily regional leaders), it is preferable to maintain a sufficiently strong (but again, without ambitions for geopolitical leadership) Russia.

Thus, for a significant number of countries worldwide, Russia's defeat also appears "disadvantageous." Interestingly, this position is changing. Just two years ago, instead of the term "disadvantageous," one could have used "unacceptable." However, the pace of change is extremely slow. Here, Ukraine bears some responsibility, as it has communicated very little externally about "post-war" issues. That is — what will happen after the war ends and how to mitigate risks from a Russian crisis in the event of a Russian defeat.

Returning to the U.S.-China pair, both countries do not desire a defeat for Ukraine, but they also do not wish for a complete defeat for Russia. Thus, from their perspective, the war should be halted somewhere between these two extremes.

The question is — where? And it is appropriate to recall the U.S.-China confrontation and the process of Russia becoming dependent on China:

• for Beijing, the ideal moment to end the war would be the initiation of negotiations after the Russian economy has passed the "point of no return" in its technological and financial ties to China. In simpler terms, this would be under conditions where even the lifting of all sanctions would not allow Russia to return to the predominant use of European and American technologies and financial instruments;
• for the U.S., Russia falling into such dependence on China is a nightmarish scenario. In that case, Beijing gains not only access to Russia's raw material base but also, for example, logistics in the Arctic, and a significant strengthening in the Middle East and Africa. Therefore, for Washington, the ideal moment to conclude peace negotiations (or freeze the war) regarding Ukraine is "just before the point of no return" when Moscow falls into Beijing's embrace. This would allow Washington to intensify cooperation with the Kremlin (possibly indirectly, through intermediary states) while maintaining a favorable level of Russian-Chinese competition for spheres of influence.

Thus, the positions from which external players will approach the issue of the Russian-Ukrainian war partially depend on the state of U.S.-China relations. Today, the countries stand on the brink of a full-fledged trade war. However, the economies of both nations are interdependent — this can be confirmed by analyzing the volumes and structure of mutual trade. Given China's growing economic and political influence, conflicts and competition are inevitable. Moreover, in the realm of new technologies, they are "incurable" — in the transition to a "knowledge economy